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3. Regulating the moderation of illegal 
online content 
Alexandre de Streel, professor of EU law at Namur University and the Namur Digital Institute 
(NADI), academic co-director at the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) and chair of the 
expert group for the EU Observatory on the online platform economy.  
Michèle Ledger, head of practice at Cullen International and senior researcher at NADI.* 
3.1. Scope and structure of this chapter 
This chapter studies the EU regulatory framework applicable to hosting intermediaries 
when they moderate online content which is illegal or in breach of their terms and 
conditions.24 Each of those concepts are already – or are about to be – defined in EU law: 
(i) Hosting intermediaries comprise all organisations which store information provided by, 
and at the request of, a recipient of the services;25 (ii) Content moderation practices cover 
all the measures that intermediaires take to manage content which is in violation of the 
law or of their terms and conditions as well as to manage their users (e.g. the suspension 
or termination of the user’s account);26 (iii) Illegal content comprises any information which 
does not comply with EU or national law, irrespective of the precise subject matter or nature 
of that law.27  
On this last concept, it is important to distinguish between: content (i) which 
violates EU or member state law and hence is illegal according to the proposed DSA 
definition; (ii) which does not violate a law but violates the terms and conditions of a 
 
* The authors wish to thank Maja Cappello and Francisco Cabrera for their very useful comments and discussions; 
as always, responsibility for the content of this article is the authors’ alone. 
24 This chapter is partly based on de Streel A. et al., “Online platforms’ moderation of illegal content online”, 
study for the European Parliament, 2020. On the rules on content moderation, see Floridi L. and Taddeo M. 
(eds), The responsibility of online service providers, Springer, 2017 and Frosio G. (ed), The Oxford handbook of 
online intermediary liability, Oxford University Press, 2020.  
25 Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market [2000] OJ L 178/1, art.14; 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031, Proposal of the Commission of 15 
December 2020 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital 
Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31, COM(2020) 825, Art. 5(1), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:825:FIN. 
26 DSA Proposal, Art. 2(p) defines content moderation as “the activities undertaken by providers of intermediary 
services aimed at detecting, identifying and addressing illegal content or information incompatible with their 
terms and conditions, provided by recipients of the service, including measures taken that affect the availability, 
visibility and accessibility of that illegal content or that information, such as demotion, disabling of access to, 
or removal thereof, or the recipients’ ability to provide that information, such as the termination or suspension 
of a recipient’s account', https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:825:FIN. 
27 DSA Proposal, Art. 2(g), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:825:FIN. 
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platform where it is posted; and (iii) which violates neither a law nor the platform’s terms 
and condition but creates harm to users, especially to the most vulnerable ones (such as  
minors). Our paper focuses mostly on the EU rules applicable to the moderation of the first 
category of online content, which is the most heavily regulated and only touches, when 
needed, on the second and third category of content.28 
The chapter follows the evolution over the years of the EU regulatory framework as 
the Internet has increased in importance for the economy and society. At the turn of the 
century when digital intermediaries were in their infancy, the Internet remained relatively 
free from state intervention as famously suggested by John Perry Barlow in his 1996 
Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace29 (section 5.2). New rules started to be adopted 
to cater for particular types of illegal content or particular types of digital intermediaries, 
marking the beginning of the end of digital exceptionalism (section 5.3). Now, new 
horizontal rules applicable for all platforms and all content are in the making, indicating 
the end of cyberspace independence (section 5.4). Although these rules are certainly a step 
in the right direction, some clarifications and improvements are possible (section 5.5). 
3.2. The independence of cyberspace: the e-Commerce 
Directive 
In 2000, the e-Commerce Directive established a special liability regime for online 
intermediary services. As explained by the European Commission,30 this regime pursued four 
main objectives: (i) to share responsibility for a safe Internet between all the private actors 
involved and to promote good cooperation with public authorities – thus, injured parties 
should notify online platforms about any illegality they observe and online platforms 
should remove or block access to any illegal material of which they are aware; (ii) to 
encourage the development of e-Commerce in Europe by ensuring that online platforms do 
not have an obligation to monitor the legality of all material they store; (iii) to strike a fair 
balance between the fundamental rights of the several stakeholders, in particular privacy 
and freedom of expression, freedom to conduct business (for platforms) and the right to 
property including intellectual property of injured parties;31 and (iv) to strengthen the digital 
single market by adopting a common EU standard on liability exemptions, especially at a 
time when national rules and case law were increasingly divergent. 
Thus, the e-Commerce Directive creates an exemption from the national liability 
regime to which the hosting platform is subject and determines the requirements to be met 
 
28 On online disinformation which is often of the third category, see Chapter 6 of this publication. 
29 https://www.eff.org/fr/cyberspace-independence.  
30 Explanatory Memorandum of the Commission of 18 November 1998 for the proposal for a directive on certain 
legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market, COM(1998)586, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:51999PC0427&rid=3. 
31 As protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Articles 7, 8, 11, 16 and 17, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 
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by the providers to benefit from such an exemption.32 A hosting platform can escape liability 
for illegal material uploaded by users when it “does not have actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent”. Should the 
platform have such knowledge or awareness, it can however benefit from the liability 
exemption if it “acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information”. 
Liability exemptions are horizontal: all types of illegal content or activities are covered 
(unfair market practices, violation of data protection rules, damage to honour and 
reputation, etc.), as well as various kinds of liabilities (criminal or civil).33 
To benefit from the liability exemptions, the hosting platform should also be neutral 
in the sense that its conduct is, in the words of the Court of Justice, “merely technical, 
automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it 
stores”.34 A related issue is whether the e-Commerce Directive disincentivises the online 
platforms to proactively monitor the legality of the material they host because, if they were 
to do so, they might lose the benefit of the liability exemption. This is sometimes referred 
to as the good Samaritan paradox. For instance, a platform carrying out ex ante moderation 
practices could be considered as playing an active role and, therefore, be excluded from 
the liability exemption. During the public consultations organised by the European 
Commission on the e-Commerce Directive, online platforms mentioned this legal risk of 
voluntarily introducing more proactive measures.35 However, in its Communication of 
September 2017 on tackling illegal online content, the European Commission considered 
that voluntary proactive measures “do not in and of themselves lead to a loss of the liability 
exemption, in particular, the taking of such measures need not imply that the online 
 
32 e-Commerce Directive, Art. 14.On the liability exemption, see Chapter 2 of this publication. Also, Kuczerawy 
A., Intermediary liability and freedom of expression in the EU: From concepts to safeguards, Intersentia, 2018, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031.  
33 Note that, even when a digital intermediary cannot benefit from the liability exemption, it would not 
necessarily be considered liable under the applicable legal framework. In this case, the national jurisdiction 
should determine whether legal requirements applicable in the member state are fulfilled (e.g. negligence 
under civil law) and, if so, decide that the intermediary should be held liable. 
34 Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton, EU:C:2010:159,  
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-236/08; 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-238/08, and Case C-324/09 L’Oreal and Others v. 
eBay and Others EU:C:2011:474, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-324/09. These cases are well 
explained in van Hoboken J., Quintais J.P., Poort J. and van Eijk N., “Hosting Intermediary Services and Illegal 
Content Online”, study for the European Commission, 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/7779caca-2537-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 
35 For the 2011 public consultation: Commission Staff Working Document of 11 January 2012, Online services, 
including e-Commerce, in the Single Market, SEC(2011) 1641, p.35, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52011SC1641. For the 2015-2016 consultation, Communication from the 
Commission of 25 May 2016, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for 
Europe, COM(2016) 288, p. 9, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0288 
and Commission Staff Working Document of 10 May 2017 on the Mid-Term Review on the implementation of 
the Digital Single Market Strategy, SWD(2017) 155, p. 28, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017SC0155&rid=1.  
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platform concerned plays an active role which would no longer allow it to benefit from that 
exemption”.36 
Another pillar of the e-Commerce Directive consists in the prohibition, for EU 
member states, on imposing a general obligation on the hosting platforms to monitor the 
material hosted.37 The Court of Justice has drawn a blurred line between general monitoring 
measures and specific monitoring measures, in particular in case of suspected violations of 
intellectual property rights. The first are prohibited;38 the second are allowed when a fair 
balance between the fundamental rights of the different stakeholders is achieved.39 
Although imposing a general obligation to monitor is not allowed, online platforms could 
decide, on a voluntary basis, to carry out spot checks on the online content. This is not 
prohibited but by doing this, the online platform could be considered as playing an active 
role as explained above. 
In addition, member states may impose on hosting providers the duty to cooperate 
with the competent authorities.40 Two types of duties are possible: spontaneous 
communication to the authorities or communication at their request. Information related to 
identification of the user who posted illegal content anonymously could be communicated 
to the victim of the illegal content (so they may bring a claim against the author) or only to 
the competent authorities.  
The last pillar of the e-Commerce Directive is the encouragement of co- and self-
regulation in implementation of the rules and principles of the Directive.41 In particular, the 
Directive mentions the importance of involving consumers in drafting codes of conduct to 
ensure that the rules remain balanced. To ensure the effectiveness of those rules, 
monitoring implementation of the codes is essential.42 This provision has led, as explained 
in the next section, to increasing reliance on co- and self-regulation to tackle certain types 
of illegal materials which have a very negative impact on society, such as hate speech, child 
abuse content or terrorist content. 
 
36 Communication of the Commission of 28 September 2017, Tackling Illegal Content Online. Towards an 
enhanced responsibility for online platforms, COM (2017) 555, p.13, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0555. 
37 e-Commerce Directive, Art. 15(1). On this, see Husovec M., Injunctions against intermediaries in the European 
Union: Accountable but not liable?, Cambridge University Press, 2017 
38 Case C-360/10 SABAM v. Netlog EU:C:2012:85; https://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-360/10,  
Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM EU:C:2011:771 
,https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-70/10; Case C‑18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. 
Facebook Ireland EU:C:2019:821, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-18/18. 
39 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH EU:C:2014:192, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-314/12; Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden, para 96, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-484/14. 
40 e-Commerce Directive, Art. 15(2),  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031. 
41 e-Commerce Directive, Art. 16, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32000L0031. 
42 In that regard, the Commission has developed some principles for better self- and co-regulation. These 
principles relate to the conception of the rules: they should be prepared openly and by as many relevant actors 
as possible; they should set clear targets and indicators and be designed in compliance with EU and national 
law. The principles also relate to the implementation of the rules: they should be monitored in a way that is 
sufficiently open and autonomous, improved in an iterative manner (learning by doing) and non-compliance 
should be subject to a graduated scale of sanctions.  
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3.3. The beginning of the end: The emerging EU regulatory 
framework for online content moderation  
As the Internet became increasingly important in the economy and influential in society, 
the EU started to take back control of cyberspace and adopted new rules for content 
moderation, first focussing on the most harmful illegal content43 and then on some specific 
types of digital intermediaries. 
3.3.1. Regulation of the moderation of specific types of online 
content 
3.3.1.1. Racist and xenophobic hate speech 
Already back in 2008, the EU adopted a Counter-Racism Framework Decision which seeks 
to combat particularly serious forms of hate speech and provides that member states must 
ensure that racism and xenophobia are sanctioned by criminal law.44 However, this Decision 
does not provide for detailed obligations related to online content moderation practices 
and more generally, the fragmentation of criminal procedural rules across member states 
makes it difficult to enforce the Decision effectively.45 
Therefore, in 2016 at the initiative of the Commission, the main online platforms 
agreed on an EU Code of Conduct on countering all forms of illegal hate speech online46 
with a series of commitments: (i) drawing users' attention to the types of content not 
allowed by their community standards/guidelines and specifying that they prohibit the 
promotion of incitement to violence and hateful behaviour; (ii) putting in place a clear and 
effective process to review reports/notifications of illegal hate speech in order to remove 
them or make them inaccessible;  reviewing notifications on the basis of the community 
standards / guidelines and national laws, and reviewing the majority of valid reports within 
24 hours; (iii) regularly training online platform staff, particularly in relation to societal 
developments; (iv) encouraging the reporting of illegal hate speech by experts, including 
through partnerships with civil society organisations – so that they can potentially act as 
trusted reporters – and strengthening partnerships and collaboration with these 
 
43 This chapter does not deal with content and material violating IP law as this is covered in Chapter 4 of this 
publication. 
44 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, O.J. [2008] L 328/55, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008F0913.  
45 Report of the European Commission of 27 January 2014 on the implementation of Council Framework 
Decision 2008/913 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal 
law, COM(2014)27, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ea5a03d1-875e-11e3-9b7d-
01aa75ed71a1.  
46 The Code is available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-
xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en.  
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organisations to support them; and (v) strengthening communication and cooperation 
between online platforms and  national authorities, in particular with regard to procedures 
for submitting notifications; collaborating with other online platforms to improve and 
ensure the exchange of best practices between them. 
While considered a step in the right direction, commentators have pointed towards 
the following weaknesses: risks of private censorship through the priority application of 
community standards / guidelines; lack of precision in determining the validity of a 
notification; absence of appeal mechanisms for users whose content has been withdrawn; 
absence of a requirement for illegal content to be reported to the competent national 
authorities when removed on the basis of the community standards / guidelines; and the 
observation that the 24-hour deadline could either make it impossible for online platforms 
to meet their commitments or could lead to over-blocking practices.47  
3.3.1.2. Child sexual abuse material 
In 2011, the EU adopted the Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Directive which requires 
member states to take content removal and blocking measures against websites containing 
or disseminating child sexual abuse material.48 Such measures must be based on 
transparent procedures and provide adequate safeguards, in particular be necessary and 
proportionate, inform the users on the reasons for restriction and ensure the possibility of 
judicial redress.49 In practice, member states have adopted two categories of measures: (i) 
notice-and-takedown measures with national hotlines to which Internet users can report 
child sexual abuse material that they find online50; and (ii) measures based on national 
criminal law such as general provisions that allow the seizure of material relevant to 
criminal proceedings (e.g. material used in the commission of an offence) or more specific 
provisions on the removal of child sexual abuse material.51 
In parallel to the efforts made by member states, a series of self-regulatory 
initiatives were taken by digital intermediaries – often encouraged by the European 
 
47 Quintel T. and Ullrich C., “Self-regulation of fundamental rights? The EU Code of Conduct on Hate Speech, 
related initiatives and beyond” in Petkova B. and Ojanen T., Fundamental rights protection online: The future 
regulation of intermediaries, Edward Elgar, 2019. 
48 Directive 2011/92 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, O.J. [2011] L 335/1, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32011L0093. The Directive provides at Art. 2, for a broad 
definition of child sexual abuse material that includes real child pornography that visually depicts a child 
engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct or virtual child pornography, i.e. computer-generated 
pornographic material involving children. In general on the EU strategy and rules to fight online child 
pornography, see Jenay P., “Combating child sexual abuse online”, study for the European Parliament, 2015, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2015)536481. 
49 Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Directive, Art. 25. Measures may consist in various types of public action, 
such as legislative, non-legislative, judicial or others. 
50 Moreover, INHOPE, a global umbrella organisation for the hotlines, encourages exchange of expertise, 
https://www.inhope.org/EN. 
51 Report from the Commission of 16 December 2016 assessing the implementation of the measures referred 
to in Article 25 of Directive 2011/93 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography, COM(2016) 872,  
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2016)872&lang=en.  
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Commission –  to better protect minors and make the Internet a safer place for children.52 
In 2017, the Alliance to Better Protect Minors Online, a multi-stakeholder forum facilitated 
by the European Commission, was set up in order to address emerging risks that minors 
face online, such as illegal and harmful content (e.g. violent or sexually exploitative 
content), conduct (e.g. cyberbullying) and contact (e.g. sexual extortion).53 It is composed of 
actors from the entire value chain (device manufacturers, telecom operators, media and 
online platforms used by children). Its action plan includes the provision of accessible and 
robust tools that are easy to use, the provision of feedback and notification, the promotion 
of content classification, and the strengthening of cooperation between the members of 
the alliance and other parties (such as child safety organisations, governments, education 
services and law enforcement) to enhance best practice sharing.54 In an evaluation of this 
alliance, Ramboll indicates that many commitments are difficult to measure, hence their 
effectiveness is difficult to assess. It also notes that the effectiveness of the alliance is 
limited by low public awareness and limited internal knowledge sharing. It therefore 
recommends increasing public awareness in order to strengthen the external monitoring of 
the commitments and to incentivise the participants to meet them and to reinforce sharing 
of good practices between members.55 
3.3.1.3. Terrorist content 
Terrorist content was the last type of content to be regulated at the EU level but is now the 
most strictly regulated. In December 2015 after terrorist attacks in several member states, 
an EU Internet forum to counter terrorist content online was established among EU interior 
ministers, high-level representatives of major online platforms (such as Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft and Twitter), Europol, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the European 
Parliament.56 One of its goals was to address the misuse of the Internet by terrorist groups 
and to reduce accessibility to terrorist content online. The forum led to an efficient referral 
mechanism in particular with the EU Internet Referral Unit of Europol, a shared database 
with more than 200,000 hashes, which are unique digital fingerprints of terrorist videos 
and images removed from online platforms. 
Then in 2017, the EU adopted the Counter-Terrorism Directive which requires 
member states to take removal and blocking measures against websites containing or 
 
52 A CEO Coalition to Make the Internet a Better place for Kids was set up in 2011, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/self-regulation-and-stakeholders-better-internet-kids, and the ICT Coalition for Children 
Online was set up in 2012, http://www.ictcoalition.eu. 
53 European Commission, Alliance to better protect minors online, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/alliance-better-protect-minors-online.  
54 The common action is complemented by individual company commitments with a specific timeline to better 
protect minors online, see:  
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/individual-company-statements-alliance-better-protect-
minors-online. 
55 Ramboll, “Evaluation of the implementation of the Alliance to Better Protect Minors Online”, study for the 
European Commission, 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/122e3bdd-237b-11e9-
8d04-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.  
56 European Commission press release of 3 December 2015, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6243. 
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disseminating terrorist content.57 These measures must follow transparent procedures and 
provide adequate safeguards, in particular to ensure that they are limited to what is 
necessary and proportionate and that users are informed of the reason for the measures. In 
practice, as with the Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Directive, member states have 
adopted two main types of measures:58 (i) notice-and-takedown measures, which differ 
among the member states on several issues such as offences covered, time limits for 
removal and consequences of non-compliance; and (ii) criminal law measures allowing a 
prosecutor or a court to order companies to remove content or block content or a website, 
within a period of 24 or 48 hours. 
Finally in 2021, the EU went one step further with the adoption of the Terrorism 
Content Regulation which imposes duties of care on hosting services providers.59 In addition 
to transparency reporting obligations,60 the main new obligations for these hosting service 
providers are to (i) remove terrorist content within one hour of receiving a valid removal 
order stemming from a national competent – not necessarily a judicial – authority;61 to (ii) 
preserve for six months removed terrorist content and related data necessary for 
administrative or judicial review or complaint handling or the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences;62 and to (iii) take specific measures (if 
they have been previously exposed to terrorist content) to address the dissemination of 
terrorist material on their services, including by deploying automated detection tools.63 It is 
interesting to note that where automated tools are used, safeguards should be put in place 
in particular through human oversight and verification. Although the specific measures are 
not precisely defined, platforms must in any case ensure they are targeted and 
proportionate to the risks of exposure and their size, are applied by taking into account the 
rights and legitimate interests of users (in particular their fundamental rights) and are 
applied in a diligent and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
57 Directive 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism, 
OJ [2017] L 88/6, Article 21, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32017L0541. 
58 Commission Staff Working Document of 12 September 2018, Impact Assessment Terrorism Content 
Regulation Proposal, SWD(2018) 408, p. 22,  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=SWD:2018:408:FIN.  
59 Regulation 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on addressing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online, OJ [2021] L 172/79, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R0784. This new Regulation will apply from 7 June 2022. Article 2(1) 
defines a hosting service provider as “a provider of information society services consisting in the storage of 
information provided by and at the request of the content provider”. 
60 Terrorism Content Regulation, Art. 7. 
61 Ibid, Art. 3. These can either be administrative, law enforcement or judicial authorities provided they fulfil 
their tasks in an objective and non-discriminatory manner and do not seek or take instructions from any other 
body in relation to the exercise of the tasks under the regulation (recital 35 and Art. 13).  
62 Ibid, Art.6. 
63 Ibid, Art. 5. 
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3.3.2. Regulation of moderation by specific types of digital 
intermediaries: Video-sharing platforms 
In addition to the regulation of specific types of online illegal content, the EU also started 
to regulate moderation practices by a specific type of digital intermediaries. Indeed, the 
2018 revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) envisages that video-
sharing platforms64 should take appropriate measures to protect: (i) the general public from  
online content which violates EU law (i.e., racism and xenophobia, child sexual abuse 
material and terrorist content); (ii) the general public from other forms of hate speech which 
violates the principles mentioned in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (i.e., sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation); and (iii) minors from content which may violate the law or be harmful and 
impair their physical, mental or moral development.65 Although the European Commission 
had initially foreseen66 that the chapter on video-sharing platforms should lead to maximum 
harmonisation, this was changed during the course of adoption of the Directive, and 
member states are therefore free to introduce more far-reaching obligations for video-
sharing platforms. 
The AVMSD lists the possible measures to be taken such as. transparent and user-
friendly mechanisms to report and flag content; systems through which video-sharing 
platforms explain to users what effect has been given to the reporting and flagging; easy-
to-use systems allowing users to rate content; transparent, easy-to-use and effective 
procedures for the handling and resolution of users' complaints. The Directive specifies that 
the measures must be appropriate in the light of the nature of the content, the potential 
harm, the characteristics of the category of persons to be protected, the rights and 
legitimate interests at stake (in particular those of the video-sharing platforms and the 
users having created and/or uploaded the content, as well as the public interest). The 
measures should also be proportionate, taking into account the size of the video-sharing 
 
64 Directive 2010/13 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the 
provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), OJ [2010] L 95/1, as amended 
by Directive 2018/1808, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02010L0013-
20181218. Article 1(1aa) defines a video-sharing platform service as “a service as defined by Articles 56 and 57 
TFEU, where the principal purpose of the service or of a dissociable section thereof or an essential functionality 
of the service is devoted to providing programmes, user-generated videos, or both, to the general public, for 
which the video-sharing platform provider does not have editorial responsibility, in order to inform, entertain 
or educate, by means of electronic communications networks (…) and the organisation of which is determined 
by the video-sharing platform provider, including by automatic means or algorithms in particular by displaying, 
tagging and sequencing.”  
65 Audiovisual Media Services Directive, Art.28b(1). on the new obligations imposed on video-sharing platforms, 
see Valcke P., “The EU regulatory framework applicable to audiovisual media services', in Garzaniti L. et al. (eds.), 
Telecommunications, broadcasting and the Internet. EU Competition law & regulation, 4th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
2019, pp. 232-235. 
66 See Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing 
market realities, COM(2016) 287,  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2016%3A287%3AFIN. 
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platform and the nature of the provided service. A national regulatory authority (often the 
media regulator) should assess the appropriateness of the measures.67  
According to the European Commission, the requirements of the AVMSD are 
compatible with the liability exemption of the e-Commerce Directive, as the measures 
imposed on video-sharing platforms relate to the responsibilities of the provider in the 
organisational sphere and do not entail liability for any illegal information stored on the 
online platforms as such.68 Moreover, the measures imposed on video-sharing platforms 
cannot lead to any ex ante control measures or upload-filtering of content.69 
3.3.3. Regulation for all: A re-interpretation of the e-
Commerce Directive 
To improve the content moderation practices of all digital intermediaries, the Commission 
also adopted in 2017 a Communication70 and then in 2018 a Recommendation71 setting 
principles for the providers of hosting services as well as member states to take effective, 
appropriate and proportionate measures to tackle illegal content online. It sets out the 
general principles for all types of illegal content online and recommends stricter 
moderation for terrorist content. 
Regarding the notice-and-takedown procedures which were not regulated by the e-
Commerce Directive and were very divergent across member states,72 the Recommendation 
calls for procedures that: (i) are effective, sufficiently precise and adequately substantiated; 
(ii) respect the rights of content providers with the possibility of counter-notices and out-
of-court dispute settlements; and (iii) are transparent.73 
Regarding proactive measures taken by the digital intermediaries to find and 
remove illegal content, the Recommendation encourages appropriate, proportionate and 
specific measures, which could involve the use of automated means, provided some 
safeguards are in place, in particular human oversight and verification.74 
Regarding cooperation, the Recommendation encourages close cooperation with 
national, judicial and administrative authorities and trusted flaggers with the necessary 
expertise and determined on a clear and objective basis; it also encourages cooperation 
 
67 Audiovisual Media Services Directive, Art.28b(3)-(7). 
68 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on 
the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning provision of audiovisual media services in view of changing market realities, COM(2016) 287. 
69 Audiovisual Media Services Directive, Art.28b(3). 
70 See fn 13. 
71 Recommendation 2018/334 of the European Commission of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle 
illegal content online, OJ [2018] L 63/50,  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018H0334. 
72 See ICF, Grimaldi Studio Legale, and 21c Consultancy, “Overview of the legal framework of notice-and-action 
procedures in Member States”, study for the European Commission, 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/a56ceb47-2446-11e9-8d04-01aa75ed71a1. 
73 Recommendation 2018/334, Points 5-17. 
74 Ibid, Points 16-21. 
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among hosting services providers, in particular smaller ones which may have less capacity 
to tackle illegal content.75 
3.3.4. Summary of the EU regulatory framework and current 
practices of online moderation 
The table below outlines the EU rules against illegal content online according to the nature 
of the legal instrument (hard law, soft law, or self-regulation). 
Table 1.  EU regulatory framework on moderation of illegal content online 
 Hard law Soft law Self-regulation 
BASELINE 
All types of hosting 
platforms and all types 
of illegal content 
online 




on Tackling Illegal 
Content Online  
- Commission Re 
commendation 2018/334 
on measures to 
effectively tackle illegal 
content online, Ch. II 
 
Additional rules for 
video-Sharing 
Platforms 
- Directive 2010/13 
Audiovisual Media 




Additional rules for 
hate speech 
- Council Framework 
Decision 2008/913 on 
combating certain forms 
and expressions of 
racism and xenophobia  
 - Code of conduct on 
illegal hate speech 
online (2016) 
 
Additional rules for 
child sexual abuse 
material 
- Directive 2011/93 on 
combating the sexual 
abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children 
and child pornography  
 - Alliance to Better 
Protect Minors Online 
(2017) 
 
75 Ibid, Points 22-28. 
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 Hard law Soft law Self-regulation 
 
 
Additional rules for 
terrorist content 
- Directive 2017/541 on 
combating terrorism 
- Regulation 2021/784 
on addressing the 
dissemination of 
terrorist content online  
- Commission 
Recommendation 
2018/334 on measures 
to effectively tackle 
illegal content online, 
Ch. III  
- EU Internet Forum 
(2015) 
Source: de Streel et al. (2020, p.33) 
Current practices of online moderation vary according to the type and size of the platforms. 
They deploy a range of content moderation practices, which may be automated and/or 
which involve human review processes. Some also deploy prevention measures to make 
sure that harmful content is not seen by users, for instance by preventing certain users from 
uploading content or by making sure that minors do not see the content, through age 
verification or age assurance systems. According to recent research, a majority of platforms 
do not review content before it is uploaded, but they place the responsibility on the 
uploader to make sure that the content is compliant with the terms and conditions of the 
platform by ticking a box to that effect.76 Most platforms have in place systems to detect 
content that may be in conflict with its terms and condition through flagging measures 
(including sometimes by trusted flaggers). Automated moderation is particularly 
widespread to detect child sexual abuse material and can lead to automatic removal if the 
illegal content is present (hashed) in a database. However, most other content detected by 
algorithms is reviewed by human moderators before it is removed. According to the same 
research, medium and large platforms invest 9% of their annual spend on in-house content 
moderation and they invest 16% to 29% of their annual spend on developing automated 
systems. 
3.4. The end of the independence of cyberspace: The Digital 
Services Act 
As a logical development of the regulatory move initiated 10 years ago, the Commission 
proposed in December 2020, with the Digital Services Act, new horizontal rules for the 
moderation of illegal content online applicable to all digital platforms and all content, 
clearly marking the end of the independence of cyberspace.77  
 
76 Report by Ernst and Young LLP, commissioned by the UK government “Understanding how platforms with 
videosharing capabilities protect users from harmful content online”, 2021, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1008128/E
YUK-000140696_EY_Report_-_Web_Accessible_Publication_2.pdf. 
77 As often explained by Commissioner Thierry Breton, the current progressive regulation of digital space repeats 
the previous progressive regulation of the terrestrial and then maritime spaces. 
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3.4.1. The proposed DSA and content moderation 
The proposed DSA provides for four main categories of online intermediaries as a series of 
Russian dolls.78 As we go from the biggest to the smallest doll, the rules imposed by the 
DSA become more numerous and stricter. 
(i) The broadest category, the biggest doll, is the provider of intermediary service, which 
covers all providers of mere conduit, caching79 and hosting services; 
(ii) Then comes the provider of hosting services defined as storage of information 
provided by, and at the request of, a recipient of the service. This category includes the 
providers of cloud, file-sharing, and webhosting services; 
(iii) Then comes the online platform defined as a provider of hosting services which, at 
the request of a recipient of the service, stores and disseminates to the public 
information. Such a category includes the providers of marketplaces, social media, app 
stores, and the collaborative economy; 
(iv) Finally, the smallest doll is the very large online platform (VLOP) which is an online 
platform with at least 45m monthly active users in the EU (i.e., 10% of the EU 
population). This category includes most of the GAFAM.80  
Rules on content moderation are scattered throughout the DSA but the approach fits with 
the logic of the proposal which is to introduce asymmetric rules depending on the type of 
intermediary (or Russian doll). In terms of the substantive rules, the proposed DSA 
introduces for the first time in EU law: transparency and due diligence obligations over 
content moderation practices; harmonised notice-and-action mechanisms with an 
obligation to motivate removal decisions; and rules on the suspension of accounts while 
granting rights to users to challenge content moderation decisions. VLOPs are subject to 
additional rules to ensure more comprehensive public oversight of their content 
moderation practices. 
Before we turn to the rules on content moderation per se, it is important to note 
that the proposal introduces a so-called good Samaritan clause. It states that digital 
intermediaries “shall not be deemed ineligible for the exemptions from liability (…) solely 
because they carry out voluntary own-initiative investigations or other activities aimed at 
detecting, identifying and removing, or disabling access to, illegal content, or take the 
necessary measures to comply with the requirements of Union law, including those set out 
in this Regulation”.81 However, it has been said that this clause may lead to over-removals 
since, unlike under the US safe harbour and the US good Samaritan clause,82 providers are 
not guaranteed protection if they fail to remove content once they have detected illegal 
content themselves. To be sure to be shielded from liability for third-party illegal content, 
 
78 Resp. DSA Proposal, Art. 2(f), 2(h) and 25,  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:825:FIN. 
79 For instance, Internet access providers, domain name registries and wi-fi hotspots. 
80 GAFAM is the name given to the five largest and most dominant companies in the information technology 
industry of the United States, i.e. Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft.  
81 DSA Proposal, Art. 6, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:825:FIN. 
82 Section 230(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 
U.S.C. § 230), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230. 
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providers could prefer to remove or disable access to the potentially illegal content, leading 
potentially to over-removals, which may impact the protection of fundamental rights, and 
in particular freedom of expression.83  
3.4.2. Asymmetric obligations 
3.4.2.1. All digital intermediaries: Transparency   
All digital intermediaries in scope (technical intermediaries, hosting service providers, 
online platforms and VLOPs) would need to clearly inform users in their terms and 
conditions of any restrictions they impose on the use of their services, including their 
content moderation policies and in particular algorithmic decision-making and human 
review. Also, service providers would need to act in a diligent, objective, and proportionate 
manner in applying any restrictions, with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests 
of all parties involved, including applicable fundamental rights.84  
On top of this, all intermediaries in scope (except for micro-enterprises) would need 
to produce annual reports on their content moderation activities, including the number of 
removal orders received from national authorities or notices received from users or flaggers, 
how fast they acted, and a detailed overview of their own-initiative content moderation 
activities (number and type of measures taken) and of the complaints-handling activities.85  
The obligation becomes stricter for online platforms as they would have to report 
on any automatic content moderation procedures, by providing information on the purpose, 
indicators of accuracy and any safeguards applied.86 VLOPs would need to publish 
transparency reports more frequently:  every six months.87 
3.4.2.2. Hosting intermediaries: Notice-and-action procedures 
Hosting service providers would need to put in place notice-and-action systems to allow 
individuals and entities to notify them of allegedly illegal content.88 The proposed DSA sets 
out the elements that need to be included in the notices. When all the elements are present, 
the provider is deemed to have actual knowledge, potentially triggering liability for third-
party illegal content, if the provider fails to take down the illegal content. From receiving 
the notice, the provider would need to act quickly by sending a confirmation of receipt of 
the notice to the sender (and of whether automated means of processing or decision-
 
83 For a detailed discussion on this point, see Chapter 2 of this publication. 
84 DSA Proposal, Art. 12, Ibid. 
85 DSA Proposal, Art. 13, Ibid. 
86 DSA Proposal, Art. 23, Ibid. 
87 DSA Proposal, Art. 33, Ibid. 
88 DSA Proposal, Arts. 14-15, Ibid. 
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making have been used) and by informing the sender of its decision which must be taken 
in a timely, diligent, and objective manner, and of the redress possibilities.  
Hosting service providers that decide to remove or disable access to content would 
always need to inform the user at the latest at the time of removal of the decision by 
providing a statement of reasons, which would have to contain certain elements. These 
elements are for instance, the facts leading to the decision, if automated means were used, 
and a reference to legal grounds or to the provider’s terms and conditions that were 
breached. The decisions and statement of reasons would need to be published in a publicly 
accessible database managed by the European Commission. 
3.4.2.3. Online platforms: Trusted flaggers, user complaints and account 
suspension 
Obligations become stricter for online platforms which also need to deal with notices 
submitted by trusted flaggers as a matter of priority and without delay.89 The status (and 
revocation) of trusted flaggers would be decided by the Digital Service Coordinator90 of the 
member state where the applicant/flagger is established if a number of set conditions are 
fulfilled. It is important to note that the status of trusted flagger is only foreseen to be 
awarded to entities and not to individuals.91 
Online platforms would also need to provide their users with easy means to 
challenge content moderation decisions. As a first step, they would need to put in place 
internal complaint handling systems to allow users to complain about content moderation 
decisions.92 Complaints would have to be receivable for at least six months following the 
contested decision. Systems would have to be available electronically, free of charge and 
be easy to access. Complaints would need to be handled in a timely, diligent, and objective 
manner and could lead to the reversal of the decision without undue delay. Online 
platforms would also need to inform complainants without undue delay of their decision 
and of the possibility of further redress mechanisms. Importantly, these decisions could not 
be taken by online platforms solely on the basis of automated means. 
On top of this, users that have been the subject of a content moderation decision 
would be allowed to resort to a certified out-of-court dispute procedure to seek redress.93 
The proposed DSA sets out the conditions under which the Digital Service Coordinator 
would have to certify out-of-court dispute resolution bodies. These conditions are aimed at 
 
89 DSA Proposal, Art.19, Ibid.. 
90 Digital Service Coordinators would be responsible for all matters relating to application and enforcement of 
the DSA in a member state, unless a member state has assigned certain specific tasks or sectors to other 
competent authorities. The requirements for Digital Service Coordinators are specified in Art. 39 of the DSA 
Proposal: they must perform their tasks in an impartial, transparent and timely manner; they must have 
adequate technical, financial and human resources to carry out their tasks; they should act with complete 
independence and remain free from any external influence; and they should neither seek nor take instructions 
from any other public authority or any private party.  
91 DSA Proposal, Rec.46, Ibid. 
92 DSA Proposal, Art. 17, Ibid. This covers decisions leading to the removal or disabling of access to information, 
and the suspension or termination of the service to the recipient, or of the user’s account 
93 DSA Proposal, Art. 18, Ibid. 




© European Audiovisual Observatory (Council of Europe) 2021 
Page 35 
ensuring in particular that the bodies are impartial and independent of the online platforms 
and that they have the necessary expertise. Online platforms would have to engage in good 
faith with the selected body and would be bound by the decision taken by the body. If the 
dispute is settled in favour of the user, the platform would need to reimburse all fees and 
expenses incurred by the user to settle the decision. Of course, users could also seek redress 
in court, in accordance with their national law.  
Of a different nature but worth noting, recipients of services would also have the 
right to lodge a complaint against providers (if they infringe the DSA) with the Digital 
Service Coordinator of the member state where the recipient resides.94 This is not a dispute 
resolution mechanism though, since the Digital Service Coordinator only needs to assess 
the complaint and where appropriate, transmit it to the Digital Services Coordinator of 
establishment. 
The proposed DSA also frames the conditions under which online platforms would 
be able to suspend the provision of services, in other words  to suspend user’s accounts.95 
This would only be possible for users that frequently provide manifestly illegal content, 
that is to say where it is evident to a layperson, without any substantive analysis, that the 
content is illegal.96 Suspension could only be temporary and after issuance of a prior 
warning. Platforms would have to take the decision on a case-by-case basis by taking into 
account a number of listed circumstances including the gravity, the number of occurrences, 
and the intention. The terms and conditions of the online platforms would have to set out 
their policy in this respect, which could contain stricter measures in case of manifestly 
illegal content related to serious crimes. A similar procedure is also foreseen to suspend 
the processing of manifestly unfounded complaints and notices. Users would be able to 
challenge suspension decisions as explained above. 
3.4.2.4. Very large online platforms: Systemic risk assessment 
Very large online platforms would have to identify, analyse and assess at least once a year 
any significant systemic risks97 stemming from their services, including the dissemination 
of content which violates the law but also content which does not violate the law but is 
harmful.98 When doing so, they would have to take into account how their content 
moderation systems influenced any of the systemic risks. On the basis of the assessement, 
the VLOPs would need to put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation 
measures (such as adapting the content moderation practices) tailored to the specific 
systemic risks identified. Moreover, the European Commission would be able to issue 
 
94 DSA Proposal, Art. 43, Ibid. 
95 DSA Proposal, Art. 20, Ibid. 
96 DSA Proposal, Rec. 47, Ibid. 
97 Systemic risks are not defined in the DSA Proposal which only provides that three categories of systemic risk 
should be analysed, DSA Proposal, Art. 26: “(i) the dissemination of illegal content through their services; (ii) 
any negative effects for the exercise of the fundamental rights to respect for private and family life, freedom of 
expression and information, the prohibition of discrimination and the rights of the child (…); (iii) intentional 
manipulation of their service, including by means of inauthentic use or automated exploitation of the service, 
with an actual or foreseeable negative effect on the protection of public health, minors, civic discourse, or actual 
or foreseeable effects related to electoral processes and public security.”, Ibid. 
98 DSA Proposal, Arts. 26-27, Ibid. 
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general guidelines in relation to specific risks, in particular to present best practices and 
recommend possible measures. 
3.4.2.5. Overseeing content moderation 
There are no special rules on the oversight of content moderation by public authorities in 
the proposed DSA although individual decisions can be challenged via internal complaints, 
by (certified) out-of-court dispute settlement and also in courts. The designated Digital 
Service Coordinator of the member state where the intermediary is established would be in 
charge of ensuring application and enforcement of the DSA, unless special tasks were 
assigned to other competent authorities.99 On top of receiving the transparency reports, the 
Digital Service Coordinator would receive certain powers of investigation such as the power 
to require providers to deliver information, to carry out on-site inspections and to ask 
members of staff to provide explanations.  
Strengthened rules are also foreseen in relation to the supervision of VLOPs, 
including the appointment of a compliance officer, the intervention of independent auditors 
and special rules to access data100 as well as the possibility for the European Commission 
to directly regulate the VLOP instead of the Digital Service Coordinator of the member state 
where the platform is established.101 
3.5. Concluding remarks 
The evolution of the EU regulatory framework on the moderation of illegal online content, 
including its most recent step with the proposed Digital Services Act, is interesting. States 
are progressively regulating cyberspace, which has become increasingly important for the 
life of their citizens and businesses, and which has not delivered on the – admittedly naïve 
–  promises of the libertarians.102 In this endeavour, states could be mindful of preserving 
the greatest opportunities of the Internet, in particular to enhance the exercise of our 
fundamental freedoms. In that regard, the approach followed by the EU is also interesting. 
On the one hand, by introducing procedural accountability obligations, it regulates the 
process of content moderation and not its results. On the other hand, it tailors the 
obligations to the risks created by illegal content and by platforms.103 However, some 
aspects of the proposed DSA could perhaps be clarified and improved.  
 
99 DSA Proposal, Art. 38, Ibid. 
100 DSA Proposal, Arts. 28, 31 and 32, Ibid. 
101 DSA Proposal, Arts. 50-66, Ibid. 
102 Like Barlow's hope of creating a “civilization of the Mind” more humane and fairer than what states had 
created before. 
103 In favour of a risk-based approach and asymmetric rules, see among others, Buiten M., de Streel A., and Peitz 
M., “Rethinking liability rules for online hosting platforms”, International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 28, 2020, pp. 139-166, https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/issue/28/2. 
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3.5.1.1. Scope 
Content moderation can take place for all kinds of illegal content, with no distinction 
between manifestly illegal content and other forms of illegal content. However, a different 
take-down procedure – possibly with accelerated deadlines, enhanced communication 
channels to public authorities and retention obligations regarding evidence (similar to what 
is foreseen under the Terrorism Content Regulation) could be envisaged for manifestly 
illegal content where it is evident to a layperson, without any substantive analysis, that the 
content is illegal.104 
Also, clear rules on the territorial scope of application of content moderation 
decisions are missing. Since illegal content is also defined by reference to national law, 
content may be illegal according to the legislation of one member state but not by 
reference to the legislation of another member state. It is therefore important to address 
the territorial scope of take-down decisions in the DSA since this could lead to over-removal 
which could jeopardise freedom of expression in certain countries. 
3.5.1.2. Challenging content moderation decisions 
The solution envisaged in the proposed DSA for online platforms is sound in our view 
because certified out-of-court dispute resolution bodies would be able to reassess and 
potentially reverse content moderation decisions. The proposal puts in place a number of 
guarantees, such as independence, but it will be important to correctly inform users of the 
redress mechanism and to specify deadlines to settle the dispute. As it stands, the proposal 
only allows “recipients of the service” (i.e. a user of a service) addressed by a content 
moderation decision to select an out-of-court dispute body to resolve a dispute. This means 
for instance that associations representing specific interests would not have the right to 
challenge content moderation decisions.  
3.5.1.3. Oversight of the use of AI content moderation tools 
Aside from the requirement to be transparent on the use of automated content moderation 
systems, the proposed DSA does not refer to criteria to be met by  technology used for the 
detection of illegal content. Thus any automated content moderation would only be subject 
to the general EU law applicable to automated systems.105 It would be helpful if any 
automated moderation system were bound to comply with the six key requirements 
proposed by the EU High-Level Expert Group on AI: human agency and oversight; technical 
 
104 Also Frosio G. and Geiger C., “Taking fundamental rights seriously in the Digital Services Act’s platform 
liability regime”, European Law Journal, 2021, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3747756. 
105 In particular the need for human oversight when privacy is at stake, Regulation 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ [2016] L 
199/1, Art. 22) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj, and the possible prohibition of manipulative AI 
systems, Proposal of the European Commission of 21 April 2021 for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules 
on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), COM(2021) 206, Art. 5), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206. 
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robustness and safety; privacy and data governance; transparency, diversity, non-
discrimination and fairness; societal and environmental wellbeing; and accountability.106 
Moreover, the VLOPs, which have the data, expertise and financial means to develop 
automated techniques, may usefully share these technologies with small and medium-sized 
or new platforms.107 Finally, it is interesting to see that the UK’s Online Safety draft bill 
specifies that the regulator (Ofcom) will be given the power to require that a service 
provider uses accredited technology, at least to identify and remove terrorist content and 
child sexual exploitation if Ofcom has reasonable grounds to believe that the service 
provider is not removing such content. 
3.5.1.4. VLOPs and fundamental rights when moderating content 
Given that VLOPs may be considered as organising a “public space”,108 it may now be time 
to ask them to respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU in their content moderation practices.109 The reference to the fact that 
online platforms need to have due regard for the rights of all parties involved, including 
applicable fundamental rights could possibly become a positive duty to respect 
fundamental rights, which of course will need to be balanced out between each other. The 
terms and conditions of VLOPs could also be scrutinised ex ante by the Digital Services 
Coordinator and/or the Commission to make sure they respect all applicable legislation. 
3.5.1.5. Journalistic content or content edited by audiovisual media service 
providers  
As a contrast to the UK’s Online Safety Bill, 110 the proposed DSA does not contain any special 
treatment in relation to professionally edited content, such as journalistic content or 
content that is under the editorial responsibility of audiovisual media service providers. The 
UK Bill specifies that so-called Category 1 services111 have special duties (to be specified by 
Ofcom in dedicated codes of conduct) to protect content of democratic importance and 
 
106 European Communication White Paper of 19 February 2020 on Artificial Intelligence - A European approach 
to excellence and trust, COM(2020) 65, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:65:FIN; 
High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines of 8 April 2019 for Trustworthy AI. See also 
Terrorism Content Regulation, Art.5(3), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ethics-guidelines-
trustworthy-ai. 
107 European Commission Recommendation 2018/334, Point 28. 
108 Elkin-Koren N. and Perel M., “Guarding the guardians: Content moderation by online intermediaries and the 
rule of law’ in Frosio G. (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Online Intermediary Liability, Oxford University Press, 2020, 
pp. 669-678, https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198837138.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780198837138-e-34.  
109 Pollicino O., Judicial protection of fundamental rights on the Internet: A road towards digital constitutionalism?, 
Hart, 2021. 
110 Draft published on 12 May 2021 (Bill CP 405), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/985033/Dr
aft_Online_Safety_Bill_Bookmarked.pdf.  
111 Category 1 services are subject to additional rules, and the thresholds to be met will be determined by the 
minister in charge (the Secretary of State). At least one of the threshold conditions would have to be the number 
of users. 
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journalistic content. In particular, the UK draft foresees that a special complaints procedure 
would need to be put in place in relation to content moderation decisions affecting access 
to journalistic content,112 with the terms and conditions of platforms having to specify the 
importance of freedom of expression when taking content moderation decisions in relation 
to such content. The recently adopted Terrorism Content Regulation also contains a special 
carve-out for material disseminated to the public for “educational, journalistic, artistic or 
research purposes or for the purposes of preventing or countering terrorism, including 
material which represents an expression of polemic or controversial views in the course of 
public debate”.113  
3.5.1.6. Protection of minors and harmful content 
With regard to legal but harmful content which could be damaging to minors, the only rules 
would apply to VLOPs and relate to systemic risk assessments and risk mitigation measures 
which would need to be taken. These measures are not defined at this stage. Nothing is 
foreseen in relation to other digital intermediaries, which will mean that this matter will be 
addressed in the platforms’ terms and conditions, without public intervention. Age 
verification measures and content rating systems are difficult areas to address at the EU 
level but leaving this whole area to member state legislation would lead to continued 
tensions between the member states and could weaken the digital single market. In this 
regard, it is interesting to note that the revised AVMSD foresees that video-sharing 
platforms should protect minors from content which may impair their physical, mental or 
moral development. Also, the UK’s Online Safety Bill which echoes many of the provisions 
of the proposed DSA foresees that all providers in scope would need to conduct a risk 
assessment of whether children are likely to access their services and providers will only 
be able to conclude that it is not possible for children to access a service if robust systems 
and processes such as age verification are in place. 
 
112 Interestingly, the text defines journalistic content as content generated for the purpose of journalism, and 
which is “UK-linked”. 
113 Terrorism Content Regulation, Art. 1.3. 
